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Abstract 
 
Risk analysis is considered as an important process to identify the known and potential vulnerabilities and 
threats in the web services security. It is quite difficult for users to collect adequate events to estimate the full 
vulnerabilities and probability of threats in the Web, due to the rapid change of the malicious attacks and the 
new computer’s vulnerabilities. In this paper, a fuzzy risk assessment model is developed in order to evaluate 
the risk of web services in a situation where complete information is not available. The proposed model 
extends Pseudo-Order Preference Model (POPM) to estimate the imprecise risk based on richness of 
information and to determine their ranking using a weighted additive rule. A case study of a number of web 
services is presented in order to test the proposed approach. 
 
Keywords: Fuzzy outranking, Risk analysis, Web services security, Pseudo-Order, POPM. 
1. Introduction 
 
Web services, based on software technologies such as WSDL, SOAP, XML, UDDI, provide an 
environment for dynamic discovery and integration of new and pre-existing software components which are 
distributed across the Web [24]. Web services are increasingly used to automatically perform a variety of 
business tasks including business-to-client and business-to-business transactions. Though web services 
provide novel means for conducting online business they create new research challenges such as dynamic 
discovery and integration of component services, performance, reliability, trust, security and risk analysis. 
This paper investigates into the risk analysis of web services security. Our literature survey identifies that a 
limited work has been done on the risk assessment of the web services security. Risk assessment assists 
experts to identify the existing and potential threats and measure the risk level (i.e., high, medium and low 
risk) in order to prevent losses pertaining to monetary, resources reputation and business opportunities. 
According to a recent survey [1] there was a total flip with 95 percent of responding organizations 
  
experiencing more than 10 web site incidents. Another survey of 2004 found that 89 percent of those 
organizations experienced more than 10 such incidents [1]. Consequently, 61% enterprises lead to financial 
losses, with a total loss of $130,104,542. In addition, it shows that the top three categories of losses—i.e., 
viruses, unauthorized access and theft of proprietary information—swamped the losses from all other 
categories. Web security tools must ensure that corporate data remains confidential, integrated, available, and 
accountable from unauthorized access. Web services security can be threatened from different directions such 
as integrity, confidentiality, denial of service, authentication, and access control. Table 1 summarises related 
threats and their consequences [2]. 
A number of security technologies and tools have been developed to prevent web security threats. The 
available security techniques [2, 3] including firework, Intrusion Detection System (IDS) security tokens, 
digital signature, key management, Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), Secure Electronic Transaction (SET), and 
XML encryption techniques have been already employed to authenticate and protect business transaction 
from unauthorized access. However, most of the new techniques for web security such as two-factor 
authentication, encrypted XML data exchange [4, 5] distributed access control [6], and Secure SOAP traffic 
[7], are based on the known threats. They neglect the risk arising from potential attack, which leads to lose the 
war of defense. 
 
 
Table 1. A summary of security threats on the Webs (Modified version of [2]) 
  Threats Consequences Countermeasures 
Integrity · Modification of user data 
· Malicious code attack 
· Modification of memory or message 
traffic in  
transit 
· Loss of information 
· Compromise of machine 
· Vulnerability to all other 
threats 
·Cryptographic checksums 
Confidentiality · Eavesdropping on the Net 
· Theft of info from server 
· Theft of data from client 
· Info about network configuration 
· Info about which client talks to server 
· Loss of information 
· Loss of privacy 
·Encryption, Web proxies 
Denial of 
Service 
· Killing of user threads 
· Flooding machine with bogus threats 
· Filling up disk or memory 
· Isolating machine by DNS attacks 
· Disruptive 
· Annoying 
· Prevent user from getting 
work    
done 
·Difficult to prevent 
Authentication · Impersonation of legitimate users 
· Data forgery 
· Misrepresentation of user 
· Belief that false information 
is  
valid 
·Cryptographic techniques 
Access 
Control 
· Data replication or modification · Loss of information ·Users access management  
Availability 
· Storage damage or system crash  
· Nature disasters 
· Disruptive 
· System Damage 
· System backup 
· Physical improvement 
 
 
  
Obviously, the risk analysis for web service security is not only limited to calculate the recognized web 
threats, but should also estimate potential risks. In fact, it is difficult for decision makers to identify the entire 
network threats and to collect precise and adequate events to estimate all probable vulnerabilities of threats. 
Risk analysis is a complex process which links to substantial ambiguous and uncertain information. The 
traditional risk analysis approaches are not readily applicable to web services, due to the assumptions of 
known threats and vulnerabilities. This paper extends Pseudo-Order Preference Model (POPM) to estimate 
the imprecise risk on alternatives depending on richness of incomplete information. Accordingly, it presents a 
new scheme to measure the potential risk of web services. The aim is to make valuable recommendations for 
web services providers so that they can improve the security of their services. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related work. Section 3 presents the proposed model. 
A case study, based on a number of web services and security measures, is given in Section 4. Section 5 
discusses the experimental results which are based on the case study. Section 6 concludes the paper and 
identifies future work. 
 
2. Related work 
Various approaches have been made to address web (services) security issues. Damiani et al [4] discuss 
various approaches in relation to web services security such as W3C XML-signature syntax and processing, 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML), and eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML). 
The aim is to identify ways in which these approaches can be utilized in providing web services with secure 
infrastructure. Similarly, Naedele [5] reviews various security standards for XML and web services such as 
SAML, XACML, XML DSig (digital signature), XML Enc (encryption) and so on. The author illustrates the 
dependencies between these standards and the issues (such as confidentiality, integrity, access control) they 
address. Bhargavan et al [7] develop mechanisms to refine WS-Trust and WS-Secure Conversation using a 
formal scripting language for security protocols. The contribution of this work is claimed to provide a formal 
approach which can be used during standardization process in order to verify security properties of a 
particular security approach. 
In addition to above, many researchers and organizations have studied information security and network 
risk assessment to assist information security managers in decision making. Carroll (1983) [8] proposed a 
familiar approach that uses the 'Annual Loss Expectancy (ALE)' to calculate the security level of an 
information asset by simply multiplying the Annual Rate of Occurrence (ARO) with the Single Loss 
Expectancy (SLE), Exposure Factor (EF) and the monetary value of assets. It could be extended to evaluate 
the security of distributed network by aggregating all components’ ALE. Furthermore, ISO13355 ISO/IEC 
TR13355-1 [9] provides qualitative models for risk assessment of organizations. Lee (1996) [10] and Chen 
(2001) [11] introduced a qualitative risk assessment method with fuzzy multi-criteria decision-making theory.  
Koller (2000) [12] analyzed classical mathematical methods and comprehensively classified the existing 
methods into five types: (1) Discriminant Function Analysis (DFA) (2) Bayesian analysis (3) Decision tree 
technique (4) Factor analysis and (5) Neural nets. Moreover, other well-known techniques for modeling risk 
assessment include the Hazard operable process, fault tree analysis, the Consultative Objective Risk Analysis 
  
System (CORAS), Consultative Objective and Bi-functional Risk Analysis (COBRA), etc. 
   However, the above quantitative and classical mathematical methods suit the situations wherein security 
data is precise and the data form is crisp. The risk analysis of web services security often holds under 
uncertainty situations with incomplete data due to the rapid change of the emerging malicious attacks and the 
new computer’s vulnerabilities in the Web. For example, it is difficult to numerically quantify the estimation 
of data being modified due to the lack of encryption protection. We believe that such estimation can be more 
appropriately modeled and evaluated using fuzzy variables. In this paper we therefore employ fuzzy logic to 
construct a parameter-driven risk analysis model for measuring web services security. 
 
3. The Proposed Model 
 
Our proposed method is based a new resolution process of risk assessment which consists of the POPM 
(Pseudo-Order Preference Model) [13] and RMGDP (Resolution Method for Group Decision Problems) 
[14-17]. The POPM is an outranking approach which allows decision makers to represent their imprecise 
preference in strict preference, weak preference, or indifference based on richness of information and then 
prioritizes the ranking of alternatives in partial order or complete order relation using non-dominant set and 
dominant set. 
The RMGDP is incorporated with POPM to resolve the group difference and obtain a collective preference 
relation as group preferences. It can be divided into the following three steps: 1) transformation process, i.e., 
to transform the individuals’ opinions into preference values, 2) aggregation process, i.e., to aggregate the 
individual preference values to obtain the group preference for all decision makers, and 3) exploitation 
process, i.e., to compute the ranking of the alternatives by group preference. These steps are explained as 
follows: 
Assume that a group of decision makers, kd  (k=1,..,m), is formed as an evaluation committee. Each 
decision maker (DM) has to evaluate a set of alternatives ia and ja  (i, j=1,…,n), based on a set of criteria 
lc (l=1,..q) with their relative importance and then assign rating
k
j
k
i xx
~~
,  to the alternatives ia  and ja . 
),(
~~
k
j
k
i xxP  denotes that the kd allocates preference degree of alternative ia  over alternative ja . The 
proposed method allows the decision makers to express their imprecise risk in linguistic quantifiers 
considering potential threats and explicitly represent them with fuzzy numbers.  
 
3.1. Transformation Process 
 
A transfer function, f, is applied to convert individual rating of alternatives to a preference relation as 
follows [18]: 
))(1(
2
1),(
~~~~
k
j
k
i
k
j
k
i
k
ij xxxxfp Θ+== , (1) 
where kijp  characterizes the preference degree between alternative ia  and ja  expressed by kd  and Θ is 
  
the subtraction operation on two fuzzy numbers. 
According to Pseudo-order preference model [13], there are three fundamental preference relations in the 
classical preference structure. These relations are: (1) Strict preference (P), (2) Weak preference (Q) and (3) 
Indifference (I) which can be applied to determine an imprecise preference relation based on the richness of 
risk information. P, Q, and I reveal the imprecise preference degree between alternative ia  and ja  
expressed (by kd ) as follows: 
 
Strict preference relation ( ji Paa ): 
ppP kji
k
ij >−  
(2) 
 
Weak preference relation ( ia Q ja ): 
ppPq kji
k
ij ≤−<  
(3)   
 
Indifference relation ( ia I ja ): 
qpP kji
k
ij ≤− ||  
(4) 
 
where the preference threshold p and indifference threshold q are defined to distinguish between strict 
preference, weak preference, and indifference relations. When the difference between k
ix
~
 and kjx
~
 exceeds p, 
it indicates that k
ix
~
 is strictly preferred to kjx
~
. Similarly, if the difference between k
ix
~
 and kjx
~
 is smaller than 
q, it means that k
ix
~
 and kjx
~
 are not regarded as significantly different. 
The POPM can flexibly characterize decision maker’s imprecise preference, but it decides the preference 
structure without considering the weighting (relative importance) of alternative. Hence two useful modified 
models are proposed in this paper－Semi-Order Preference Model (SOPM) and Complete-Preorder 
Preference Model (CPPM). These are derived from [19] in order to develop an appropriate method for risk 
assessment. 
SOPM is a special case when 0,0 ≠= qp . It is applied to obtain the outranking relation between 
alternatives when the relative importance of each alternative is predictable. Weak preference relation is 
neglected, and only the indifference threshold is employed to discriminate the preference or indifference 
relation. The relations between two alternatives ( ji aa , ) for a specific decision maker kd are shown as 
follows: 
 
  
ia∀  and Aa j ∈ ,  
Preference relation: 
qpP kji
k
ij >−  
(5) 
 
Indifference relation: 
qpP kji
k
ij ≤− || , 
(6) 
 
where indifference threshold q is defined in order to distinguish the preference degree between ia  and ja . 
CPPM is used for obtaining a complete order for alternatives when a decision maker can express his/her 
explicit preference on alternatives in a precise matter. It is also a special case of POPM, when ,0=p  0=q , 
where no threshold is used. In general, the decision maker is likely to obtain a complete order relation on 
alternatives when precise and sufficient information is gathered. 
 
3.2 Aggregation Process 
 
Assume that the relative importance of each decision maker is given, the collective preference ( cijP ), an 
aggregation of the individual preferences },...,{ 1 mijij pp (m is the number of decision makers), for the set of 
kd  (k=1,..,m) can be aggregated by the weighted sum of kijP  as, 
 
,
1
k
ij
m
k
k
c
ij PwP ⋅= ∑
=
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=∑
=
m
k
kw
 (7) 
 
Once cijP  is obtained, decision makers could prioritise the ranking of alternatives based on group preference 
using the exploitation process detailed in the following section. 
 
3.3 The Exploitation Process 
 
The exploitation process is a consequence of identifying the priority of alternatives of group preference. 
Three preference models are introduced to discriminate the ranking of alternatives as follows:   
 
A. Pseudo-order preference model  
  
When the relative importance of decision maker is absent, the outranking relation is defined as follows 
[13]: 
Outranking relation  ( ia S ja ): 
ij Paa is false, and |||||| CBA >+ , 
 
where },{ ji PaaA = },{ jiQaaB = }.{ ijQaaC =  
(8) 
 
Incomparability relation ( ia R ja ): 
otherwise 
(9) 
|x| represents the cardinality of the finite set x = {A, B, C..}. From Eq.(8), we see that ia  outranks ja  if 
no criterion supports that ja  is strictly preferred to ia , and the number of assessments which support 
that ia  is strictly preferred to ja , is more than the number of assessments, which consider that ja  is 
weakly preferred to ia . Otherwise, ia  is incomparable to ja  [19]. 
B. Semi-order preference model 
 
When the relative importance of decision maker is given, the outranking relation is defined as: 
 
Outranking relation ( ia S ja ): 
qPP cji
c
ij >− , 
(10) 
 
Incomparability relation ( ia R ja ): 
qPP cji
c
ij ≤− || , 
(11) 
 
From Eq.(10), we see that ia  outranks ja , if the difference between weighted sum of kijP  and kjiP  is 
greater than q. Otherwise, ia  is incomparable to ja . According to [13], this model is extended to identify 
the partial-order ranking of alternatives which might be more rational than the original approach. The 
outranking relation of the original approach ( ia S ja ), is that ij Paa is false and
kykjXj
ww ∑∑
∈∈
> . It considers 
outrank relation as two conditions (i.e., preference relation P and sum of weighting) must hold true at same 
time. However, this rule may be excessively strict for two consecutive alternatives and it may lead to having 
  
too many incomparability relations and lowering the discrimination capability. Hence we use Eq. (10) as the 
outrank function  
C. Complete-preorder preference model 
 
When precise and sufficient information is gathered, the outranking relation can be judged using two 
well-known fuzzy ranking indexes – Non-Dominance Degree and Dominance Degree. 
 
Dominance Degree: 
 
The Dominance Degree (DD) can quantify the dominance that ia has preference degree over all others 
where ja  (j=1,…,n). As a result, it is used for prioritizing the ranking order with collective preference 
defined in Eq. (12) 
∑
≠
=−
=
n
ij
j
c
ijiDD p
n
au
11
1)( . (12) 
Non-Dominance Degree: 
 
Orlovsky (1978) [20] developed a method for fuzzy ranking by means of fuzzy preference relations. The 
method determines the best alternative by group preferences. The Non-Dominance Degree (NDD) of fuzzy 
ranking can be calculated by individual preference relation, which is formulated as follows:  
 
∑
≠
=
−
−
=
n
ij
j
jiiNDD d
n
au
1
)1(
1
1)(  (13) 
}.0,max{ cijcjiji ppd −=   
 
By applying Non-Dominance Degree and Dominance Degree, the outranking relation is defined as: 
 
Outranking relation ( ia S ja ): 
)()( jDDiDD auau > , 
(14) 
 
Indifference relation  ( ia I ja ): 
)()( jDDiDD auau = , 
(15) 
 
  
where )( iNDD au  is used for identifying the best alternative that can validate the ranking results of 
)( iDD au . 
 
4.  Risk assessment: A case study 
 
In this section a case study of risk analysis for web services is given in order to test the validity of the 
proposed approach.  The  case study comprises five web services which are evaluated by a  group of 
decision makers kd (k=1,..,6)  according to six security factors including integrity, confidentiality, 
authenticity denial of service, access control and availability [2] — which are evaluated using the following 
eleven sub-criteria )11,...,1( =lCl . 
The five web services used in this case study include: a ticket selling web service ( 1a ), two travel agent 
web services ( 2a  and 3a ), a civil lodge web service ( 4a ), and  hotel booking web service ( 5a ). These are 
evaluated through the eleven security criteria  including: web security policy ( 1c ), information security 
framework ( 2c ), digital signature ( 3c ), XML encryption ( 4c ), system fault-tolerance( 5c ), user access 
management ( 6c ), disaster recovery ( 7c ), key management ( 8c ), privacy preferences management ( 9c ), 
system log audit ( 10c ), user authentication ( 11c ). These criteria, derived from major security techniques [2, 21, 
22], are employed to evaluate the risk analysis method. 
The relative weightings of the above security criteria )11,..,1( =lwl are evaluated with linguistic scale [23] 
listed in Table 2, and the normalized weightings for all criteria are calculated and given in Table 3. 
The risk rating of alternative ia  with respect to risk criterion lc is given by the qn×  fuzzy risk evaluation 
matrix },...,1;,...,1|{ ~~ qlnivV il === . The decision makers assign the linguistic scale to fuzzy evaluation matrix 
~
V  (shown in Table 4), using five-level linguistic scales. These scales can be transformed into numeric form 
through the fuzzy membership function, as depicted in Table 5.  
 
               TABLE 2. Linguistic scale for weight of security criteria 
Linguistic Scale Quantitative Scale 
Very Important (VI) 5 
Rather Important (RI) 4 
Important (I) 3 
Less Important (LI) 2 
Unimportant (U) 1 
 
According to [10, 11], the aggregative rating of risk of an information asset ia  assessed by kd  is given 
by  
))(...)((
~
11
~~
k
q
k
iq
kk
i
k
i wvwvx ⊗⊕⊕⊗=           (16) 
  
 
where ⊕ , ⊗ are the addition and multiplication operations for fuzzy numbers. By applying Eq. (16), the 
aggregative ratings of risk for each alternative are calculated. 
 
 
 
 
         Table 3. Weightings of 11 security criteria 
Criterion Quantitative Scale Normalized Weight 
1c
 5 0.114 
2c
 4 0.091 
3c
 5 0.114 
4c
 3 0.068 
5c
 4 0.091 
6c
 4 0.091 
7c
 3 0.068 
8c
 4 0.091 
9c
 4 0.091 
10c
 3 0.068 
11c
 5 0.114 
 
Table 4. Linguistic scales for the risk rating 
Items 
Assets 
1c  2c  3c  4c  5c  6c  7c  8c  9c  10c  11c  
1a
 M M H H M H M M M H H 
2a
 M H VH M M H M M H M H 
3a
 M H H M M H M M H H M 
4a
 L H H VH M M M H VH M M 
5a
 M H M H H VH M M H M M 
 TABLE 5. Linguistic scale for the risk rating 
Linguistic Scale Membership Function 
Very Low (VL) (0.0,0.1,0.3,0.5) 
Low (L) (0.1,0.3,0.5,0.7) 
Medium (M) (0.3,0.5,0.7,0.9) 
High (H) (0.5,0.7,0.9,1.0) 
Very High (VH) (0.7,0.9,1.0,1.0) 
 
 
After obtaining the aggregative ratings of risk for each decision maker, we apply group decision theory to 
aggregate group ratings by three steps [14] and prioritize the ranking as follows:  
Step1: Transformation Process 
For each of the six decision makers, his / her preference rating on five alternatives is converted to fuzzy 
preference relation using Eq.(1): 
  
















=
50.0370.0290.0070.0420.0
630.050.0420.0200.0420.0
710.0580.050.0280.0500.0
930.0800.072.050.0720.0
710.0580.0500.0280.050.0
1
ijp
        
















=
50.0440.0275.0220.0605.0
560.050.0335.0280.0605.0
725.0665.050.0445.0770.0
780.0720.0555.050.0825.0
455.0395.0230.0175.050.0
2
ijp
  
















=
50.0300.0290.0205.0655.0
700.050.0495.0405.0655.0
710.0510.050.0415.0665.0
795.0595.0585.050.0750.0
545.0345.0335.0250.050.0
3
ijp
,       
















=
50.0420.0370.0185.0455.0
580.050.0450.0265.0455.0
630.0550.050.0315.0505.0
815.0735.0685.050.0690.0
625.0545.0485.0310.050.0
4
ijp
  
















=
50.0630.0670.0440.0490.0
370.050.0540.0310.0490.0
330.0650.050.0270.0450.0
560.0690.0730.050.0680.0
380.0510.0550.0320.050.0
5
ijp
       
















=
50.0375.0345.0110.0660.0
625.050.0470.0235.0660.0
6550.0530.050.0265.0690.0
890.0765.0735.050.0925.0
465.0340.0310.0075.050.0
6
ijp
 
Step 2: Aggregation Process  
 
It is assumed that the relative importance of six decision makers is determined by his/her job experiences 
and roles of jobs, and the normalized weights are given as ]10.0,20.0,15.0,20.0,15.0,1.0[=kw . All preference 
relations can be aggregated to calculate the collective preference relation ( cijp ) using Eq. (7).  
















=
50.0345.0322.0207.0468.0
459.050.0385.0261.0468.0
489.0421.050.0288.0488.0
604.0547.0524.050.0600.0
395.0341.0329.0210.050.0
c
ijp
 
 
Step 3: Exploitation Process  
 
A. Pseudo-order preference model 
When the preference threshold p=0.85 and indifference threshold q=0.25 are adopted [19], the 
non-dominance set and dominance set are obtained according to Eqs. (8), (9): }{},{ 32 aaSNDD = , and 
},,{ 154 aaaSDD = . It is obvious that alternatives 2 and 3 outrank alternatives 4, 5, and 1. 
 
B. Semi-order preference model 
Assume that indifference threshold q=0.10, decided by sensitivity analysis, the non-dominance set and 
dominance set are obtained according to Eqs. (10), (11): },{},{)( 432 aaaaS iNDD =  and },{)( 51 aaaS iDD = . Clearly, 
the risk ranking of alternatives 2, 3, and 4 outranks alternatives 1 and 5. Sensitivity analysis of p, q for 
pseudo-order and preference model semi-order preference model will be discussed in Section 5. 
 
C. Complete-preorder preference model 
In order to obtain the “best” alternative and the complete order of each alternative, the dominance degree 
(DD) and the non-dominance degree (NDD) are calculated as follows: 
  
 
a. Dominance Degree (DD) 
 
The dominance degree of alternatives is calculated using Eq. (12) as:  
1a      2a    3a     4a     5a  
)( iDD au   0.318  0.569  0.421  0.393  0.336   
 
Obviously, the risk ranking of alternatives is 51432 aaaaa ffff . 
 
b. Non-dominance Degree (NDD) 
 
By applying Eq. (13), the non-dominance degree of alternatives is shown as follows:  
 
1a      2a     3a     4a     5a  
)( iNDD au    0.812  1.000  0.941  0.919  0.831 
 
Clearly, the corresponding maximal set of NDD is }{)( 2aaS iNDD = . From the computational results of 
Eqs. (12), (13), we conclude that the complete order of alternatives is: 
51432 aaaaa ffff  
 
5. Discussion of the results 
 
In Pseudo-Order Preference Model, the preference threshold, p, is set to 0.85 and the indifference threshold 
q is set to 0.25, respectively. Alternatives 2 and 3 outranks alternatives 4, 5, and 1. The selection of two 
thresholds may be changed by the different confidence-level of decision makers. If decision makers have 
precise and sufficient information, they might increase the value of the preference threshold and 
discrimination capability, and vice versa. The higher preference threshold implies that the decision makers 
have higher confidence levels. 
In semi-order preference model, the selection of indifference threshold q is an important issue. From 
Table 6, we know that the choice of value for q will affect the preference structure of SOPM. If the 
indifference threshold is decreased, then the discrimination capability is increased and the non-dominant set 
becomes smaller. For example, only alternative 2 locates in non-dominance set when q resides in [0.1,0.2], 
otherwise, alternatives 2,3, and 4 could be selected when q=0.35. 
 
 
      TABLE 6. Sensitivity analysis for semi-order preference structure 
q Preference Structure 
0.40 },,,,{ 15432 aaaaaSNDD = , {}=DDS  
  
0.35 },,{ 432 aaaSNDD = , },{ 15 aaSDD =  
0.30 },{ 32 aaSNDD = , },,{ 154 aaaSDD =  
0.20 }{ 2aSNDD = , },,,{ 1534 aaaaSDD =  
0.10 },{},{)( 432 aaaaS iNDD = , },{)( 15 aaaS iDD =  
 
 
It is observed that the discrimination capability of pseudo-order preference model is decided by two 
thresholds, which might be affected by the preciseness and completeness of data collection. Consequently it 
will influence the confidence levels of the decision makers. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Web service security is an important issue for e-Commerce. How to assess risk in web service security 
breaches and their potential damage is a challenging task, due to insufficient information available. The 
problem is compounded by the existence of vague information in the decision making process. In order to 
overcome the inadequacy of the existing approaches, the proposed method incorporates a pseudo–order 
preference model and fuzzy logic to measure the risk of web service security problem under imprecise and 
incomplete information situation. Consequently, our approach explores imprecise preference structure of risk 
evaluation and objectively outranks the security of web services. In this paper, an example of an e-Commerce 
application was used to illustrate that the importance of potential risks can be classified according to a group 
of experts’ opinions with various confidence levels. Future work will focus on the rational selection of the 
preference threshold and indifference threshold, and will address the relationship between two thresholds and 
confidence levels of decision makers.  
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